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Abstract—With the explosive growth of wireless data, the
sheer size of the mobile traffic is challenging the capacity of
current wireless systems. To tackle this challenge, mobile edge
caching has emerged as a promising paradigm recently, in which
the service providers (SPs) prefetch some popular contents in
advance and cache them locally at the network edge. When
requested, those locally cached contents can be directly delivered
to users with low latency, thus alleviating the traffic load over
backhaul channels during peak hours and enhancing the quality-
of-experience (QoE) of users simultaneously. Due to the limited
available cache space, it makes sense for the SP to cache the
most profitable contents. Nevertheless, users’ true valuations of
contents are their private knowledge, which is unknown to the
SP in general. This information asymmetry poses a significant
challenge for effective caching at the SP side. Further, the cached
contents can be delivered with different quality, which needs
to be chosen judiciously to balance delivery costs and user
satisfaction. To tackle these difficulties, in this paper, we propose
an optimal auction mechanism from the perspective of the SP.
In the auction, the SP determines the cache space allocation
over contents and user payments based on the users’ (possibly
untruthful) reports of their valuations so that the SP’s expected
revenue is maximized. The advocated mechanism is designed to
elicit true valuations from the users (incentive compatibility)
and to incentivize user participation (individual rationality).
In addition, we devise a computationally efficient method for
calculating the optimal cache space allocation and user payments.
We further examine the optimal choice of the content delivery
quality for the case with a large number of users and derive
a closed-form solution to compute the optimal delivery quality.
Finally, extensive simulations are implemented to evaluate the
performance of the proposed optimal auction mechanism, and
the impact of various model parameters is highlighted to obtain
engineering insights into the content caching problem.
Index Terms—Content caching, content delivery quality, mech-
anism design, optimal auction
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decades have witnessed dramatic proliferation of
wireless data. It has been projected that the volume of mobile
traffic in 2020 will become 1000 times of that in 2010 [1].
Compounding the issue of congested wireless networks is the
rapid growth in social network traffic, and indeed many people
view contents on their mobile devices. In particular, a content
can become viral, in the sense that it has a rapid increase in
popularity in a short time. This has resulted in tremendous
pressure on wireless service providers (SPs), because moving
a large volume of data into and out of the cloud wirelessly
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requires substantial spectrum resources, and meanwhile may
incur annoying latency and jitter.
A key observation is that many content requests by users
are highly repetitive, which would lead to numerous redun-
dant transmissions. With this insight, mobile edge caching is
emerging as a new paradigm to alleviate the unprecedented
demand on network traffic. Residing on the network edge,
mobile edge caching can offer storage resources to mobile
users through low-latency wireless connections, facilitating a
number of mobile services. It is forecast that, by caching
contents on network edge, up to 35% traffic on the backhaul
can be reduced. Specifically, SPs can prefetch popular contents
and cache them locally at the network edge during off-peak
hours when the cellular systems have plenty of resources. As
such, the traffic burden of the costly backhaul transmissions
is significantly mitigated during peak hours while the quality-
of-experience (QoE) of users is also enhanced due to the low
transmission delay between local caches and users.
Due to its promising prospect, content caching has attracted
extensive research interests in the past few years. Many works
have been devoted to various resource allocation issues in
caching systems to optimize content placement, caching, rout-
ing and delivery [2]–[12]. Besides, coded caching [13]–[17],
fundamental scaling law [18]–[23], as well as information-
theoretic issues [24]–[26] have also been studied extensively in
the literature. In addition, different parties in caching systems,
such as content providers (CPs), SPs and users, are often non-
cooperative organizations or individuals seeking to maximize
their own benefits instead of the overall social welfare, which
are amenable to mechanism design [27] and game theory
[28]. This has spurred a recent tide in designing incentive
mechanisms and game-theoretic solutions to content caching
networks [29]–[35]. Surveys on content caching systems are
available in [36]–[39].
In most existing works on caching systems, user demands
of centents are assumed to be either deterministically given or
known with fixed distributions. However, in practice, rational
users often make strategic content access decisions in response
to the content caching and pricing schemes defined by the
SPs or CPs. The goals of the users are to maximize their
own payoffs selfishly based on their valuations of the con-
tents. Moreover, users’ true valuations of contents are usually
private knowledge unknown to the SPs/CPs. This information
asymmetry makes user demands hardly predictable and may
compromise the SPs’ profits in content caching systems.
In this paper, we are motivated to design incentive mech-
anisms for strategic users requesting contents from an SP.
2To alleviate the traffic load during peak hours, the SP may
download some contents from CPs during off-peak hours in
advance and cache them in the network edge such as small-
cell base stations (SBSs). The prefetched contents can enhance
the quality-of-experience (QoE) of users due to the reduction
of transmission latency and the users, in turn, pay the SP for
the QoE improvement. Because of the limited cache/storage
capacity, the SP will only prefetch those most profitable
contents from their respective CPs. Nevertheless, the SP is not
aware of the users’ true valuations or willingness-to-pay, which
hinders the SP from choosing profitable contents to prefetch.
In this paper, we design an optimal auction mechanism [40] to
maximize the SP’s profit. The users report their valuations (not
necessarily truthfully) to the SP, who decides the amounts of
contents to be cached and the payments of users based on the
reports. The main contributions of this work are summarized
as follows.
• An optimal auction mechanism is designed for the SP
to prefetch contents and charge users, in a way that
maximizes his expected revenue while ensuring truthful
reports and user participation. Different from existing
optimal auction formulations [40]–[43], in this paper, the
auctioneer (SP) has multiple objects (contents) to sell
and the transfer of objects (content delivery) incurs costs,
which can be controlled by judicious design of delivery
quality. The same content can be shared by multiple users
and hence introduces coupling.
• A systematic method of finding the optimal cache space
allocation over contents is presented under certain regu-
larity conditions. In addition, based on the special struc-
ture of the optimal cache space allocation scheme, we
devise a computationally efficient method for calculating
the optimal user payments.
• Based on the proposed optimal auction mechanism for
content caching, we further examine the optimal choice
of the content delivery quality for the case with a large
number of users. A closed-form solution is presented to
determine the optimal delivery quality so as to maximize
the expected revenue of the SP.
• Extensive numerical experiments are conducted to eval-
uate the performance of the proposed optimal auction
mechanism. The impact of various model parameters is
studied empirically to obtain engineering insights into the
content caching problem.
Next, we briefly review the related work of this paper.
A. Related Work
In the literature, many research efforts have been devoted
to various resource allocation issues in caching systems. In
[2], Abedini and Shakkottai investigated content caching and
scheduling in the presence of elastic and inelastic traffic
by using queueing theory. In [3], Pacifici et al. studied
bandwidth allocation for peer-to-peer (P2P) caches with a
Markov decision process (MDP) formulation and proposed
approximately optimal allocation policy to reduce the costly
internet traffic. In [4], decentralized cooperative caching was
studied and caching methods adaptive to the real-time content
popularity were proposed to minimize energy consumption of
the networks. Furthermore, transient data caching was consid-
ered in [5], where the tradeoffs between data freshness and
multihop communication costs were identified. In addition,
the problem of joint caching and routing in networks was
investigated in [6] and approximate solutions were presented
to minimize the access delay of users. Distributed adaptive
content placement in caching networks was analyzed in [7] to
minimize routing costs. Content caching in device-to-device
(D2D) networks was examined in [8], where contents could
be cached at either base stations or user terminals. Real-time
proactive caching with uncertain time-varying user demands
was investigated in [9]–[11] by means of smart pricing or user
demand shaping and prediction. In addition, several practical
caching algorithms were developed and evaluated by real data
from global video content delivery networks (CDNs) in [12].
Furthermore, due to the selfishness of agents in caching
systems, many works consider from the viewpoint of game
theory and mechanism design, which are more closely related
to this paper. In [29], Dai et al. presented Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction mechanisms to maximize the social
welfare in a collaborative caching system with multiple SPs
trading bandwidth with each other. In [30], Li et al. considered
a video caching system where a SP leased SBSs to multiple
video retailers (VRs). Through leasing the SBSs, the SP made
profit while the VRs could provide faster video transmission to
their users. A Stackelberg game formulation of the interaction
between the SP and the VRs was put forth to maximize
the payoffs of the SP and the VRs jointly. Later, Liu et al.
extended the model to an information asymmetric scenario,
in which the SP only knew the distribution of the CPs’
popularity among users [31]. The authors proposed a contract-
theoretic approach to maximize the profit of the SP, who is
the monopolist of the caching system. In [32], Pacifici and
Dan studied distributed caching with mutiple networked SPs
(caches), among which contents could be shared between
neighbors with certain latency. Invoking cooperative game
theory, the authors proposed convergenet scalable algorithms
for distributed caching. Analogous caching problem among
networked SPs was investigated through the lens of non-
cooperative game theory in [33] by the same authors. In
addition, strategic caching and pricing decisions of multiple
information centric networks (ICNs) were investigated with
game theory in [34] while fairness issues in collaborative
caching were examined through Nash bargaining in [35].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model is formally presented and the auction
design problem is formulated. In Section III, we design the
optimal auction for content caching and examine the optimal
choice of content delivery quality. Numerical results are given
in Section IV and we conclude this work in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a model with one SP, m CPs and n users, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. The SP may be in charge of one or
several base stations serving users within some region. The
CPs provide (sell) contents to the SP, who transmits them
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Fig. 1: An illustration of the caching system under study
to the interested mobile users. To mitigate the traffic burden
during peak hours, the SP may prefetch (download) some
contents and store them in its local cache at the base stations
during off-peak hours in advance. When requested (typically
during peak hours), the prefetched contents at the cache can be
delivered to users with low latency, leading to better QoE for
users [37]. In turn, the users pay the SP, who thus gains more
profits. In what follows, we detail the model of the content
caching system in Fig. 1 and formulate the mechanism design
problem.
A. System Model
Henceforth, we call the content from CP i content i, i =
1, ...,m. Denote the set of contents that interests user j as
Sj ⊂ {1, ...,m}, j = 1, ..., n. For instance, a Netflix client
may be interested in certain categories of movies. On the other
hand, denote the set of users interested in content i as Ωi ⊂
{1, ..., n}. Thus, i ∈ Sj is equivalent to j ∈ Ωi. Each user
j has a valuation (or willingness-to-pay) tj of those contents
that interest her, i.e., contents in Sj . The valuation tj is called
the type of user j and depends on factors such as the user’s
demand of contents and economic conditions (richer users tend
to have higher valuations or willingness-to-pay). The valuation
tj is only privately known by user j and is unknown to the SP
and other users. To model this uncertainty to others, we assume
that tj is a random variable (r.v.) over the interval Tj = [aj , aj ]
with probability density function (PDF) fj(tj) and cumulative
distribution function Fj(tj). The realization of the r.v. tj is
only revealed to user j while the distribution functions are
common knowledge to all users and the SP. The valuations
t = [t1, ..., tn] are assumed to be independent across users.
The joint type space of all users is denoted as T = T1×· · ·×Tn
while the joint PDF is denoted as f(t) = Πnj=1fj(tj).
To download content i, the SP needs to pay CP i with unit
price ri, which is set by CP i and considered fixed hereafter.
After acquiring contents, the SP delivers them to users as per
requests with certain content delivery/transmission quality θ >
0, e.g., the video quality of video contents. To deliver contents
to k users with quality θ, the SP incurs a unit cost of kh(θ),
where h : R+ 7→ R+ is the cost function of content delivery.
The quality parameter θ is controlled by the SP. If user j
receives contents in Sj with quality θ, his unit satisfaction
level will be θtj , which depends on both her valuation tj and
the content delivery quality θ.
B. Problem Formulation for Auction Mechanism Design
Given the limited available cache size at the base stations,
the SP aims at downloading the most profitable contents, i.e.,
those interest many users with high valuations. A challenge
faced by the SP is that he does not know the private valuations
of users. What the SP knows is only the distribution of the user
valuations. Thus, an incentive mechanism is imperative for
the SP to elicit truthful valuation information from users and
to extract maximal profit. According to the direct revelation
principle [44], each user j first reports her type (possibly
untruthfully) as τj ∈ Tj , which may deviate from her true
type tj . After collecting all the reports τ = [τ1, ..., τn] ∈ T
from all users, the SP allocates the cache space over contents
and charges users according to a mechanism specified by the
tuple 〈p(·),x(·)〉. Here, we define p(·) = [p1(·), ..., pm(·)]
T
with pi : T 7→ [0, 1] prescribing the fraction of caching space
used to store content i, i.e., pi(τ ) is the fraction of caching
space for content i given the reports τ . Furthermore, we define
x(·) = [x1(·), ..., xn(·)]
T with xj : T 7→ R prescribing the
payment of user j, i.e., xj(τ ) is the payment of user j when
the reports are τ . If all users report their true types, the
expected revenue (ER) of the SP is:
ER =∆
∫
T
 n∑
j=1
xj(t)−
m∑
i=1
pi(t)ri −
m∑
i=1
pi(t)|Ωi|h(θ)
 f(t)dt,
(1)
where |Ωi| is the cardinality of the set Ωi and the integrands
correspond to the user payments, content acquisition costs and
content delivery costs, respectively. Given users’ reports τ ∈ T
and their true types t ∈ T, the ex-post utility of user j under
the mechanism is:
uj(τ, t) =
∆
∑
i∈Sj
pi(τ )
 θtj − xj(τ ). (2)
Denote T−j = T1× · · · ×Tj−1×Tj+1× · · · ×Tn as the type
space excluding user j and f−j(t−j) = Π
n
j′=1,j′ 6=jfj′(tj′ ) as
the joint PDF of types excluding user j. Thus, if user j reports
τj while his true type is tj and other users are truth-telling,
her interim (expected) utility is:
vj(τj , tj) =
∆
∫
T−j
uj(τj , t−j, tj , t−j)f−j(t−j)dt−j . (3)
Define the truth-telling interim utility of user j as v˜j(tj) =
∆
vj(tj , tj). To incentivize truthful reports of user types, a
key step is to guarantee that truth-telling is a Baysian Nash
equlibrium [28], i.e.,
v˜j(tj) ≥ vj(τj , tj), ∀τj , tj ∈ Tj , ∀j = 1, ..., n, (4)
which is called the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. In
addition, to incentivize users’ participation of the auction, the
mechanism should satisfy the following (interim) individual
rationality (IR) constraint:
v˜j(tj) ≥ 0, ∀tj ∈ Tj , ∀j = 1, ..., n, (5)
4TABLE I: Notations of the model
Notations Definitions
m The number of CPs or contents
n The number of users
Sj The set of contents that interest user j
Ωi The set of users interested in content i
Tj = [aj , aj ] The type space of user j
fj(tj) The PDF of the type of user j
ri The unit price of downloading content i
θ The quality of content delivery
h(θ) The unit cost of delivering content with quality θ
p(·) The cache space allocation mechanism
x(·) The payment mechanism
uj(τ , t) The ex-post utility of user j
vj(τj , tj) The interim utility of user j
v˜j(tj) The truthful interim utility of user j
which means non-negative truth-telling interim utility. Besides,
the mechanism obviously needs to satisfy the following frac-
tion feasibility (FF) constraint:
pi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,m,
m∑
i=1
pi(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T. (6)
Overall, the optimization problem faced by the SP is to design
optimal auction mechanism 〈p(·),x(·)〉 and optimal delivery
quality θ such that the IC, IR, FF constraints are satisfied and
its ER is maximized, i.e.,
Maximizep,x,θ ER in (1)
subject to

FF in (6),
IC in (4),
IR in (5),
θ > 0.
(7)
There are several differences between the optimal auction
problem (7) in this paper and the classical Myerson’s optimal
auction [40] as well as other applications of optimal auction
in various resource allocation problems in [41]–[43]. First,
unlike traditional optimal auction problems, the auctioneer
(SP) has multiple objects (m contents from different CPs)
to sell. Different objects (contents) have different popularity
(captured by Ωi) among users and the acquisition of different
objects incurs different costs (captured by ri). The same
content can be shared by multiple users and hence brings
forth coupling, i.e., different users may be interested in the
same content so that caching it by the SP can benefit multiple
users. In fact, exploiting this redundancy in content usage
is the keystone of information centric networks and caching
systems so that frequently requested contents need not be
transmitted repetitively through the costly backhaul channels.
Second, different from existing optimal auction frameworks, in
this paper, content delivery incurs costs which are controlled
by the auctioneer through the delivery quality parameter θ.
Increasing θ boosts users’ utilities and thus incentivizes them
to pay more. From the perspective of the SP, this enhances
its profit extration from users at the expense of higher content
delivery costs. Thereby, a judiciously chosen θ is important to
achieve the optimal profit-cost tradeoff. The notations of the
model are summarized in Table I.
III. OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN
In this section, we solve the optimal auction problem in (7).
We first fix the content delivery quality θ > 0 and solve for
the optimal auction mechanism 〈p(·),x(·)〉. To this end, we
transform the IC, IR constraints and the objective function into
more tractable forms, and find the optimal mechanism after
imposing some regularity conditions on the type distributions
(Theorem 1). We next show how to compute the optimal
payment efficiently (Proposition 3) and demonstrate a property
of the optimal mechanism (Proposition 4). Once obtaining the
optimal mechanism 〈p∗(·),x∗(·)〉, we further endeavor to find
the optimal content delivery quality θ under the assumption
that the number of users n is very large (Theorem 2), which
is well justified by the prevalence of various content services
and mobile networks.
A. Optimal Auction with Fixed Content Delivery Quality θ
In this subsection, we fix θ and solve for the optimal
〈p(·),x(·)〉. In other words, for fixed θ > 0 we solve the
following problem:
Maximizep,x ER in (1)
subject to

FF in (6),
IC in (4),
IR in (5).
(8)
From (2) and (3), we write:
vj(τj , tj) = θtj p˜j(τj)− x˜j(τj), ∀τj , tj , ∀j = 1, ..., n, (9)
where we have defined:
p˜j(τj) =
∆
∫
T−j
∑
i∈Sj
pi(τj , t−j)
 f−j(t−j)dt−j , (10)
x˜j(τj) =
∆
∫
T−j
xj(τj , t−j)f−j(t−j)dt−j . (11)
We can transform the IC, IR constraints into equivalent
tractable forms according to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose the FF constraint in (6) holds. Then, the
necessary and sufficient condition for IC in (4) and IR in (5)
is:
(i) p˜j(·) is an increasing function for each j = 1, ..., n.
(ii) For any tj ∈ Tj , j = 1, ..., n: v˜j(tj) = v˜j(aj) +
θ
∫ tj
a
j
p˜j(τj)dτj .
(iii) For each j = 1, ..., n: v˜j(aj) ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Based on Lemma 1, we can simplify the expected revenue,
i.e., the objective function of problem (8), as follows.
5Lemma 2. For any feasible mechanism of problem (8), i.e.,
〈p(·),x(·)〉 satisfying the FF, IC and IR constraints, the
expected revenue becomes:
ER =−
n∑
j=1
v˜j(aj) + θ
∫
T
{
n∑
j=1
[
tj −
1− Fj(tj)
fj(tj)
−
h(θ)
θ
]
·
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
}f(t)dt− ∫
T
[
m∑
i=1
pi(t)ri
]
f(t)dt.
(12)
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we see that problem (8) is
equivalent to:
Maximizep,x ER in (12)
subject to
{
FF in (6),
(i), (ii), (iii) in Lemma 1.
(13)
According to definitions, v˜j(·) is related to both p(·) and x(·)
while p˜j(·) only depends on p(·) (independent of x(·)). We
note that, for ER in (12), only the first term −
∑n
j=1 v˜j(aj)
depends on x(·) and the rest terms are independent of x(·).
Furthermore, constraints FF and (i) in Lemma 1 depend on
p(·) only and are independent of x(·). Therefore, if we fix
some p(·) satisfying constraints FF and (i) of Lemma 1 and
optimize over x(·), problem (13) becomes:
Maximizex −
n∑
j=1
v˜j(aj)
subject to: (ii), (iii) in Lemma 1.
(14)
The solution to problem (14) is given as follows.
Proposition 1. For fixed p(·) satisfying constraints FF and
(i) of Lemma 1, the optimal solution to problem (14) is:
x∗j (t) =
∆ θtj
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)− θ
∫ tj
aj
∑
i∈Sj
pi(τj , t−j)dτj ,
∀j = 1, ..., n, ∀t ∈ T, (15)
which achieves the optimal value of 0.
Proof. According to (iii) in Lemma 1, we see that the optimal
value of (14) is no greater than 0. From (15), we know that, for
any t−j ∈ T−j , x
∗
j (aj , t−j) = θaj
∑
i∈Sj
pi(aj , t−j). So, (iii)
of Lemma 1 holds with equality for x∗(·), i.e., v˜j(aj) = 0 for
each j. Substituting (15) into the L.H.S. of (ii) in Lemma 1,
interchanging the order of integrals and noting the definition
of p˜j(·), we can show that (ii) also holds for x
∗(·). So, x∗(·)
is feasible for problem (14). Meanwhile, it also achieves an
objective function value of 0. Thus, it is optimal for problem
(14).
Next, we optimize over p(·). According to Proposition 1,
we only need to solve the following problem:
Maximizep
∫
T
{
n∑
j=1
[
θtj −
θ(1 − Fj(tj))
fj(tj)
− h(θ)
]
·
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
− m∑
i=1
pi(t)ri
}
f(t)dt
subject to
{
FF in (6),
(i) in Lemma 1.
(16)
Define cj(tj) =
∆ tj −
1−Fj(tj)
fj(tj)
, for any j = 1, ..., n, tj ∈ Tj .
Note that cj(·) is a function depending only on the distribution
of the true type of user j. To facilitate solving problem (16), we
make the following regularity assumption, which is common
in the mechanism design literature [40]–[42].
Definition 1. [Regularity] The optimal auction problem (8)
is regular if cj(·) is an increasing function on Tj for each
j = 1, ..., n.
We remark that this regularity condition holds for many fa-
miliar distributions, e.g., uniform distributions and exponential
distributions. One may refer to [45] for a partial list. Under the
regularity assumption, we can compute the optimal solution to
problem (16) as follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose the optimal auction problem (8) is
regular. Then, the optimal solution p∗(·) to problem (16)
is constructed as follows. For each t ∈ T, define k =
argmaxi=1,...,m
{∑
j∈Ωi
[θcj(tj)− h(θ)]− ri
}
, whose value
depends on t. Then, the optimal p∗(t) is given as:
p∗k(t) = 1, p
∗
i (t) = 0, ∀i 6= k,
if maxi=1,...,m
{∑
j∈Ωi
[θcj(tj)− h(θ)]− ri
}
> 0;
p∗i (t) = 0, ∀i = 1, ...,m, otherwise.
(17)
Proof. We first omit the constraint (i) of Lemma 1 and study
the following relaxed version:
Maximizep The objective function of (16)
subject to: FF in (6).
(18)
Later, we will show that the optimal solution to this relaxed
problem happens to satisfy (i) as well, i.e., it is also optimal
for the original problem (16). We note both the objective and
the constraint of problem (18) are decoupled across types. So,
problem (18) can be solved for each given type t ∈ T. For
fixed t ∈ T, by making use of the definition of cj(·) and
rearranging terms in the objective function, we can rewrite
the corresponding problem as:
Maximizep(t)
m∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ωi
[θcj(tj)− h(θ)] − ri
 pi(t)
subject to:
{
pi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,m,∑m
i=1 pi(t) ≤ 1.
(19)
6Problem (19) is a simple linear program (LP), whose optimal
solution is clearly p∗(t) given in (17). It now remains to
show that p∗(·) satisfies statement (i) in Lemma 1, i.e.,∫
T−j
[∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t)
]
f−j(t−j)dt−j is an increasing function of
tj ∈ Tj for every j ∈ {1, ..., n}, so that the aforementioned
relaxation is exact.
To this end, for any j ∈ {1, ..., n}, consider arbitrary
τj , tj ∈ Tj with τj ≤ tj . By the regularity assumption,
we have cj(τj) ≤ cj(tj). From the construction of p
∗(·) in
(17), we know that
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j) is either 0 or 1, for
any t−j ∈ T−j . Next, for arbitrarily fixed t−j ∈ T−j , we
distinguish two cases.
Case 1:
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j) = 1. In such a case, there exists
some l ∈ Sj such that p
∗
l (τj , t−j) = 1. Hence, according to
the construction of p∗(·), we have:
θcj(τj)− h(θ) +
∑
s∈Ωl,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− rl (20)
= max
{
max
i∈Sj
{
θcj(τj)− h(θ) +
∑
s∈Ωi,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]
− ri
}
,max
i/∈Sj
{∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri
}}
(21)
> 0. (22)
Thus, for any i ∈ Sj: θcj(τj) − h(θ) +
∑
s∈Ωl,s6=j
[θcs(ts) −
h(θ)]− rl ≥ θcj(τj)−h(θ)+
∑
s∈Ωi,s6=j
[θcs(ts)−h(θ)]− ri.
Adding θcj(tj)− θcj(τj) on both sides, we obtain, ∀i ∈ Sj :∑
s∈Ωl
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− rl ≥
∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri. (23)
On the other hand, for any i /∈ Sj:∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)] − ri (24)
≤ θcj(τj)− h(θ) +
∑
s∈Ωl,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− rl (25)
(a)
≤
∑
s∈Ωl
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− rl, (26)
where (a) follows from the fact that cj(τj) ≤ cj(tj).
Combining inequalities (23) and (26), we thus conclude l =
argmaxi=1,...,m
{∑
r∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri
}
. Moreover,
we note that maxi=1,...,m
{∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri
}
=∑
s∈Ωl
[θcs(ts) − h(θ)] − rl ≥ θcj(τj) − h(θ) +∑
s∈Ωl,s6=j
[θcs(ts) − h(θ)] − rl > 0, where the second
last step results from cj(τj) ≤ cj(tj) and the last step
follows from (22). Hence, according to the construction
of p∗(·), we have p∗l (t) = 1, p
∗
i (t) = 0, ∀i 6= l. So,∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t) = 1 =
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j).
Case 2:
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j) = 0. In such a case,
since
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t) is either 0 or 1, we evidently have:∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j) ≤
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t).
Combining cases 1 and 2, we always have∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j) ≤
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t), for any t−j ∈ T−j .
Thus,
∫
T−j
[∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j)
]
f−j(t−j)dt−j ≤∫
T−j
[∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t)
]
f−j(t−j)dt−j . Hence, p
∗(·) satisfies
statement (i) in Lemma 1 and it is optimal for problem
(16).
Remark 1. The optimal cache space allocation mechanism
p∗(·) can be explained as follows. Suppose all users report
their true types t, as guaranteed by the IC constraint. If the
SP allocates all cache space to content i, i.e., pi(t) = 0,
pl(t) = 0, for any l 6= i, then the social welfare comprised
of the SP’s profit and all users’ utilities is
∑
j∈Ωi
(θtj −
h(θ)) − ri. If we replace the true valuation tj with a virtual
valuation cj(tj), then the virtual social welfare becomes∑
j∈Ωi
(θcj(tj) − h(θ)) − ri. Thus, according to Proposition
2, the optimal allocation mechanism p∗(t) is to allocate all
the cache space to the content i that yields the greatest virtual
social welfare if this greatest virtual social welfare is positive.
Otherwise, if the greatest virtual social welfare is negative
(i.e., the virtual social welfare of every content is negative),
then the SP will not cache any content. Therefore, the optimal
allocation mechanism is to maximize the virtual social welfare
(including zero in which case the SP caches nothing). Note
that this assertion can only facilitate our comprehension of
the mechanism. It cannot be directly implemented since the
virtual social welfare is an ex-post quantity, i.e., it depends
on the realizations of types t which are private information of
users. In fact, the reason that we use virtual valuation cj(tj)
instead of the true valuation tj is just to incentivize users to
report their private types truthfully.
Propositions 1 and 2 together specify the optimal auction
mechanism 〈p∗(·),x∗(·)〉 for problem (8), as summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose the optimal auction problem (8)
is regular. The optimal solution 〈p∗(·),x∗(·)〉 to problem
(8) is given as follows. For each fixed t ∈ T, define
k = argmaxi=1,...,m
{∑
j∈Ωi
[θcj(tj)− h(θ)]− ri
}
. Then,
the optimal cache space allocation mechanism p∗(t) at this
particular t is prescribed by equation (17). Furthermore, the
optimal payment mechanism is given by:
x∗j (t) = θtj
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t)− θ
∫ tj
a
j
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j)dτj ,
∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}, ∀t ∈ T. (27)
According to Theorem 1, to compute the optimal
payment x∗j (t), we need to calculate the integral∫ tj
aj
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j)dτj for arbitrarily given t, which
is hard to implement directly. Thanks to the special structure
of the optimal allocation mechanism p∗(·), we can compute
this integral (and thus the payment x∗j (t)) efficiently for any
given t, j, as stated in the following.
Proposition 3. Suppose the optimal auction problem (8) is
regular. For each given t ∈ T and j ∈ {1, ..., n}, we define
a number βj and a function φj : Tj 7→ R as follows (their
7dependence on t is suppressed):
βj =
∆ max
{
0,max
i/∈Sj
{∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri
}}
, (28)
φj(τj) =
∆ θcj(τj)− h(θ)
+ max
i∈Sj
 ∑
s∈Ωi,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri
 , ∀τj ∈ Tj .
(29)
Then, we have:∫ tj
a
j
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j)dτj =

tj − aj , if φj(aj) ≥ βj ,
0, if φj(tj) < βj ,
tj − ξj , if φj(aj) < βj ≤ φj(tj).
(30)
In the last case of (30), we have defined:
ξj =
∆c−1j
(
1
θ
[
βj + h(θ) −max
i∈Sj
{ ∑
s∈Ωi,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]
− ri
}])
, (31)
where c−1j (·) means the inverse function of cj(·)
1.
Proof. Fix arbitrary t ∈ T and j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Define:
l =∆ argmax
i∈Sj
{∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri
}
(32)
= argmax
i∈Sj
 ∑
s∈Ωi,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri
 , (33)
in which we suppress the dependence of l on t and j to avoid
cluttered notations. Suppose l is the unique maxima for (33),
which happens with probability 1. Thus, for any τj ∈ Tj ,
i ∈ Sj , i 6= l, we have:
φj(τj) = θcj(τj)− h(θ) +
∑
s∈Ωl,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− rl
(34)
> θcj(τj)− h(θ) +
∑
s∈Ωi,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)] − ri.
(35)
So, from the construction of p∗(·) in Proposition 2, we know
that p∗i (τj , t−j) = 0. Hence, we have:∫ tj
aj
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j)dτj =
∫ tj
aj
p∗l (τj , t−j)dτj . (36)
Note that φj(·) is an increasing function on Tj . We thus
distinguish three cases.
Case 1: φj(aj) ≥ βj . In such a case, φj(τj) ≥ βj ,
for any τj ∈ [aj , tj ]. From the definition of βj in (28),
1A sufficient condition for the existence of the inverse function c−1
j
(·) is
that cj(·) is strictly increasing and continuous. Otherwise, one can replace
c−1
j
(zj) with inf{t′j ∈ Tj |cj(t
′
j
) ≥ zj} since the regularity assumption has
already guaranteed that cj(·) is (weakly) increasing.
equations (34), (35) and the construction rule of p∗(·), one
can easily see that p∗l (τj , t−j) = 1, for any τj ∈ [aj , tj ].
Thus,
∫ tj
a
j
p∗l (τj , t−j)dτj = tj − aj .
Case 2: φj(tj) < βj . In such a case, we have
φj(τj) < βj , for any τj ∈ [aj , tj ]. Analogously, we can
assert that p∗l (τj , t−j) = 0, for any τj ∈ [aj , tj ]. So,∫ tj
aj
p∗l (τj , t−j)dτj = 0.
Case 3: φj(aj) < βj ≤ φj(tj). In such a case, from the
definition of ξj in (31), we know that it is the unique solution
of the equation φj(ξj) = βj over the interval [aj , tj ]. Hence,
for τj ∈ [aj , ξj), we have φj(τj) < βj and thus p
∗
l (τj , t−j) =
0. On the other hand, for τj ∈ [ξj , tj ], we have φj(τj) ≥ βj
and thus p∗l (τj , t−j) = 1. Combining these two situations, we
derive
∫ tj
a
j
p∗l (τj , t−j)dτj = tj − ξj .
Combining the results in the three cases and noting relation
(36), we conclude the proposition.
We note that the R.H.S. of (30) can be calculated easily for
arbitrarily given t ∈ T and j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Therefore, Propo-
sition 3 provides us a simple way of computing the optimal
payment x∗j (t). Moreover, making use of Proposition 3, we
can show the following intuitively reasonable proposition of
the optimal mechanism 〈p∗(·),x∗(·)〉.
Proposition 4. Suppose the optimal auction problem (8)
is regular. For any t ∈ T and any j ∈ {1, ..., n}, if∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t) = 0, then x
∗
j (t) = 0.
Proof. Suppose
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t) = 0. We will show by contra-
diction that φj(tj) < βj . Otherwise, if φj(tj) ≥ βj , then we
have
θcj(tj)− h(θ) +
∑
s∈Ωl,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− rl ≥ βj , (37)
where we define
l =∆ argmax
i∈Sj
 ∑
s∈Ωi,s6=j
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)] − ri
 .
From the definition of βj in (28), we have for any i /∈ Sj :∑
s∈Ωl
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− rl ≥
∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri. (38)
From the definition of l, we can see that (38)
holds for i ∈ Sj as well. Hence, we have
l = argmaxi=1,...,m
{∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)] − ri
}
.
From (37) and βj ≥ 0, we further know that
maxi=1,...,m
{∑
s∈Ωi
[θcs(ts)− h(θ)]− ri
}
≥ 0. According
to the construction of p∗(t), we thus have p∗l (t) = 1 and
p∗i (t) = 0 for any i 6= l. Noting that l ∈ Sj , we get∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t) = 1, which is a contradiction. So, we must have
φj(tj) < βj , which implies
∫ tj
aj
∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (τj , t−j)dτj = 0
according to Proposition 3. Hence, according to the
construction of x∗(·) in Theorem 1, we obtain x∗j (t) = 0.
Remark 2. Proposition 4 asserts that, in the optimal mecha-
nism, a user does not pay anything if no content of her interest
is cached by the SP, as expected. In such a case, her ex-post
8utility is also zero, i.e., u(t, t) = 0 (c.f. Equation (2)). Fur-
thermore, we note that for each t ∈ T, p∗(t) is either 0 or ek
for some k ∈ {1, ...,m}, where ek = [0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0]
T (the
sole 1 takes place at the k-th entry). Thus, for the condition in
Proposition 4 to hold, we distinguish the following two cases
for each t ∈ T. If there exists k such that p∗(t) = ek, then∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t) = 0, for any j /∈ Ωk. If p
∗(t) = 0, then obviously∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t) = 0 for any j = 1, ..., n. The assertion in
Proposition 4 will be confirmed empirically through numerical
experiments in Section IV.
B. Optimial Determination of Content Delivery Quality θ
The optimization problem (8) is for fixed delivery quality
θ > 0. In this section, we let θ vary and determine the
optimal θ to further maximize the ER, i.e., solving the op-
timization problem (7). By using the optimal auction mecha-
nism 〈p∗(·),x∗(·)〉 specified in Theorem 1, the corresponding
optimal value of the ER becomes a function of θ as follows:
ER
∗(θ)
=
∫
T

m∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ωi
(θcj(tj)− h(θ))− ri
 p∗i (t)
 f(t)dt,
(39)
which is difficult to evaluate in general based on the construc-
tion of p∗(·) in Proposition 2. For analysis tractability, we next
focus on the case meeting the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The number of users n is large.
Assumption 2. The type distributions of all users are the
same, i.e., fj(·) = f(·), Fj(·) = F (·), aj = a > 0, aj = a
for any j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Moreover, this common distribution
satisfies the regularity condition in Definition 1.
Assumption 3. For each content i ∈ {1, ...,m}, each user
j ∈ {1, ..., n} is included into Ωi, i.e., user j is interested in
content i, with probability qi ∈ [0, 1] independently.
Assumption 4. The cost function h(·) satisfies the follow-
ing properties. h(0) = 0; h is convex; h′(0) = 0; and
limθ→+∞ h
′(θ) = ∞.
Assumption 1 is reasonable since the user density has
increased dramastically in the recent decade with the ad-
vancement of mobile networks and devices. Assumption 2
is a homogeneity hypothesis commonly used in the analysis
of large-scale systems. Assumption 3 is widely adopted in
the popularity modeling of content centric networks, where
qi characterizes the popularity of content i, e.g., the Zipf
distribution of content popularity [18], [19], [21]. Assumption
4 collects common properties of cost functions in resource
allocation [46]. Under these assumptions, the optimal θ for
problem (7), or equivalently the θ that maximizes ER∗(θ) in
(39), can be computed as in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then, the
optimal θ for problem (7), maximizing ER∗(θ) in (39), is given
by θ∗ = (h′)−1(a), where (h′)−1 means the inverse function
of h′, the derivative of h(·).
Proof. From Assumption 2, we note that cj(·) = c(·), ∀j =
1, ..., n. For any t ∈ T and any i ∈ {1, ...,m}, we have:
1
n
∑
j∈Ωi
[θc(tj)− h(θ)]− ri

=
|Ωi|
n
 θ
|Ωi|
∑
j∈Ωi
c(tj)
− h(θ)
− ri
n
. (40)
By the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) [47], we
know that
|Ωi|
n =
1
n
∑n
j=1 1(j ∈ Ωi)
a.s.
−−→ E[1(1 ∈
Ωi)] = qi, where 1(·) is the indicator function. More-
over, by SLLN, we have 1|Ωi|
∑
j∈Ωi
c(tj)
a.s.
−−→ E[c(t1)] =∫
T1
[
t1 −
1−F (t1)
f(t1)
]
f(t1)dt1 = a, where we use integra-
tion by parts in the last step. Substituting these limits
into (40), we obtain 1n
{∑
j∈Ωi
[θc(tj)− h(θ)]− ri
}
a.s.
−−→
qi[θa − h(θ)]. Denote k = argmaxi=1,...,m qi. According
to the construction of p∗(·) in Proposition 2, we distin-
guish two cases. If θa − h(θ) > 0, then p∗k(t) = 1,
p∗i (t) = 0, ∀i 6= k, ∀t ∈ T. In such a case, for
any t ∈ T, 1n
∑m
i=1
{∑
j∈Ωi
[θcj(tj)− h(θ)]− ri
}
p∗i (t) =
1
n
{∑
j∈Ωk
[θcj(tj)− h(θ)]− rk
}
a.s.
−−→ qk[θa − h(θ)] and
ER
∗(θ) ≈ nqk[θa − h(θ)]. Otherwise, if θa − h(θ) ≤ 0, then
p∗i (t) = 0, ∀i = 1, ..,m, ∀t ∈ T and ER
∗(θ) = 0. According
to Assumption 4, we know that [θa − h(θ)]
∣∣
θ=0
= 0 and
d
dθ [θa − h(θ)]
∣∣
θ=0
= a > 0. Thus, θa − h(θ) > 0 for small
enough θ > 0. As such, the optimal θ∗ that maximizes ER∗(θ)
is θ∗ = argmaxθ>0{θa−h(θ)} = (h
′)−1(a), where we make
use of the convexity of h(·) in Assumption 4.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, extensive numerical experiments are carried
out to evaluate the performance of the proposed optimal
auction mechanism for content caching. In particular, the
impact of various model parameters is studied empirically to
get engineering insights into the content caching problem. All
results involving expectations are average over 104 indepen-
dent trials.
Consider a content caching system (c.f. Fig. 1) with
m = 3 CPs and n = 10 users. Each content interests 6
randomly chosen users as follows: Ω1 = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10},
Ω2 = {1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9} and Ω3 = {1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10}. The content
delivery cost function is h(θ) = αθ2, where α = 0.1
for now. We set the content delivery quality to be θ = 1
temporarily. The acquisition costs of the 3 contents are set
to be r1 = 4.2036, r2 = 1.2714, r3 = 4.0714, which are
chosen randomly. In the following simulations, we consider
two user type distributions, namely uniform distribution and
exponential distribution, both of which satisfy the regularity
condition in Definition 1. For uniformly distributed user types,
we set the the lower and upper bounds of user type supports to
be aj = 1+0.1(j−1) and aj = 4+0.1(j−1), j = 1, ..., n, re-
spectively. In addition, for exponentially distributed user types,
i.e., fj(tj) = λje
−λjtj for tj ≥ 0, we set the distribution
parameters to be λj =
1
10+0.4(j−1) , j = 1, ..., n, so that the
expected types of users form an arithmetic progression. For
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Fig. 2: The payment, utility and fraction of contents of each user
either uniformly distributed types or exponentially distributed
types, the expected types of users increase with user index.
We first study the expected payment E[x∗j (t)], the expected
utility E[uj(t, t)] = E
[(∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t)
)
θtj
]
− E[x∗j (t)], and
the expected fraction of contents E
[∑
i∈Sj
p∗i (t)
]
of each
user j. The results for uniformly distributed user types and
exponentially distributed user types are shown in Fig. 2-(a)
and Fig. 2-(b), respectively. From Fig. 2-(a), we observe that
users with more expected fraction of contents generally tend to
have higher expected utility and payment. Furthermore, among
users with similar expected fraction of contents (e.g., users 1,
3, 5), those with higher expected types pay more, i.e., the SP
extracts more profits from those users with high valuations
than those with low valuations. These phenomena highlight
the fairness of the proposed optimal auction mechanism.
Analogous observations can be drawn from Fig. 2-(b) for
exponentially distributed user types. In addition, the expected
cache space allocations E[p∗(t)] are [0.17, 0.657, 0.146]T and
[0.183, 0.259, 0.175]T for uniformly distributed types and ex-
ponentially distributed types, respectively. We remark that
the expected idle cache space E[1 − 1Tp∗(t)] at the SP for
exponentially distributed types is greater than that for the
uniformly distributed types. The reason is that the exponential
distribution often realizes low types (the PDF is a decreasing
function), which may lead to the decision of no caching at the
SP. Besides, we note that the expected caching space allocated
to content 2 is the largest among the three contents, in accor-
dance with the large valuations of users in Ω2 (the user indices
in Ω2 is the largest among the three contents). Moreover, we
study the payment, utility and fraction of contents for users
in one typical realization of types t. The results are shown in
Fig. 2-(c) and Fig. 2-(d) for uniformly distributed types and
exponentially distributed types, respectively. In either case,
the cache space allocation is p∗(t) = [0, 1, 0]T, i.e., the
entire cache space is allocated to content 2. We observe that
payments are nonzero only for those users whose fraction
of contents are positive, i.e., those in Ω2 in this case, as
guaranteed by Proposition 4. Additionally, for users in Ω2 with
similar type realizations (e.g., users 3 and 8 in Fig. 2-(c)), those
with higher expected types pay more. The reason is that, to
incentivize users with high expected types to report truthfully
(as requested by the IC constraint), the SP will charge them
relatively high payments even if their reports are low. This is
to deter these users from reporting low types while possessing
high true types, which are very probable since their expected
types are high.
Next, we investigate the impact of type distributions on the
expected revenue (ER) of the SP and the expected average
utility of users. Suppose user types are i.i.d. uniformly dis-
tributed with aj = a, aj = a for any j. First, we remain
the length of the support of the type distributions, i.e., a− a,
to be fixed at 3 and let the expected type, i.e., 12 (a + a),
vary from 2 to 6.5. In other words, we set (a, a) to be
(0.5, 3.5), (1, 4), (1.5, 4.5), ..., (5, 8). In such a way, the level
of uncertainty of types remains unchanged while the expected
types increase. The ER of the SP and the expected average util-
ity of users are shown in Fig. 3-(a) and Fig. 3-(d), respectively.
We observe that the ER of the SP increases with the expected
valuation of users. This is reasonable because users with higher
valuations tend to pay more to the SP. In addition, as the
expected valuation of users increases, the expected average
utility of users first increases and then saturates. This suggests
that, when users’ valuations are high enough, the SP may reap
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pected type for uniformly distributed types
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(e) Expected average utility of users versus length
of support for uniformly distributed types
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(f) Expected average utility of users versus λ for
exponentially distributed types
Fig. 3: Impact of type distributions on the ER of the SP and the expected average utility of users
all the excess valuations from users in the optimal auction
mechanism, whose goal is to maximize the SP’s ER. Secondly,
we keep the expected type of users 12 (a + a) fixed at 5 and
let the length of the support a− a vary from 0 to 9. In such
a case, the level of uncertainty in user types increases while
the expected types remain unaltered. The corresponding ER
of the SP and the expected average utility of users are shown
in Fig. 3-(b) and Fig. 3-(e), respectively. Unsurprisingly, the
ER of the SP decreases with the length of the support of type
distributions, since the uncertainty of user valuations hinders
the SP’s profit extraction. Moreover, as the length of support
increases, the expected average utility of users first increases
because the uncertainty in users’ private valuations prevents
the SP from charging too much payments. In particular, the
expected average utility of users vanish when the length of the
support is zero. In such a case, user types become deterministic
so that the SP can reap all possible profits from the users.
Interestingly, the expected average utility of users decreases
slightly after the length of the support is large enough (c.f.
Fig. 3-(e) when the length of support is larger than 7). The
reason may be that, when user types are very uncertain, the
SP cannot extract enough profit to compensate the content
delivery and acquisition costs so that he often chooses not
to cache anything. This in turn hurts the expected utility of
users. Thirdly, we consider i.i.d. exponentially distributed user
types with distribution parameters λj = λ for all j. We let
λ increase so that the expected types (1/λ) decrease. The
corresponding ER of the SP and the expected average utility
of users are shown in Fig. 3-(c) and Fig. 3-(f), respectively.
We observe that, as the expected user valuation decreases
(i.e., λ increases), both the ER of the SP and the expected
average utility of users decrease. This is reasonable since
high valuations of users benefit both the SP and the users
themselves.
Furthermore, we examine the impact of the content delivery
quality θ on the SP and the users. Suppose user types are
i.i.d. uniformly distributed on [a, a], where we set a = 1 and
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Fig. 4: Impact of θ on the ER of the SP and the expected
average utility of users
a = 4. Suppose we have a (relatively) large number of users
n = 100 and each Ωi is formed according to the procedure in
Assumption 3 with q1 = 0.7, q2 = 0.5, q3 = 0.4. It can be
easily verified that the quadratic content delivery cost function
h(θ) = αθ2 satisfies Assumption 4, wheree α is set to be
0.1 here. Thus, Assumptions 1-4 all hold true. According to
Theorem 2, the optimal θ∗ that maximizes the ER of the SP is
θ∗ = a2α = 5. To confirm this empirically, we report the ER of
the SP and the expected average utility of users with varying
θ in Fig. 4-(a) and Fig. 4-(b), respectively. From Fig. 4-(a),
we observe that, in accordance with our theoretical result, the
optimal θ∗ to maximize the ER of the SP is 5. From 4-(b),
we further see that the value of θ that maximizes the expected
average utility of users is 8, which is larger than 5, the optimal
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(b) Impact of the content popularity on the expected average
utility of users
Fig. 5: Impact of the content popularity (captured by |Ωi|)
θ∗ for the SP. This is reasonable since improving the delivery
quality θ directly benefits users and only indirectly benefits
the SP through users’ payments. As such, users tend to prefer
higher delivery quality than the SP does.
Next, we study the impact of content popularity, which
is captured by |Ωi|. We return to the case of n = 10
users whose types are uniformly distributed with parameters
aj = 1 + 0.1(j − 1) and aj = 4 + 0.1(j − 1) for all j. For
simplification, we let each content interest the same number
of users k, i.e., |Ω|i = k for all i, and each Ωi consists of k
randomly picked users. The ER of the SP and the expected
average utility of users with varying k, i.e., varying number
of users interested in each content, are illustrated in Fig. 5-(a)
and Fig. 5-(b), respectively. We observe that both the ER of
the SP and the expected average utility of users increase with
content popularity. As contents become more popular, the SP
can reap profits from more users. On the other hand, each user
is charged with lower price and her utility can be boosted.
We also examine the impact of the number of users n on the
ER of the SP and the expected average utility of users in Fig.
6-(a) and Fig. 6-(b), respectively. We set each |Ωi| to be 0.6n,
i.e., each content interests a constant proportion of users. We
observe that the ER of the SP increases with n because the
SP can collect more profits from more users. The expected
average utility of users is increasing at first and gradually
saturates for large n. This suggests that, in the optimal auction
mechanism, the SP will not further discount its content prices
if the number of users is already large enough.
In addition, we investigate the impact of content delivery
cost function, which is controlled by the coefficient α in the
quadratic cost function used here. The greater the α is, the
higher the content delivery cost for the same delivery quality
θ, which is set to be 0.1 here. We report the ER of the SP
and the expected average utility of users in Fig. 7-(a) and
Fig. 7-(b), respectively. We observe that, as α increases, both
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Fig. 7: Impact of content delivery cost function (captured by
α)
the ER of the SP and the expected average utility of users
decrease while the former decreases faster. This is reasonable
since increasing delivery cost directly hurts the SP and only
reduces users’ utility indirectly through increasing payments.
Last but not least, we examin the impact of modeling errors
of user type distributions. Suppose the true distribution of user
j’s type is uniform distribution over the interval [atruej , a
true
j ].
Because of factors such as lack of past usage history, the
SP may not be able to infer the true parameters atruej and
atruej accurately. Instead, due to lack of information, the SP
may choose to adopt more conservative estimates (thus a
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Fig. 8: Impact of the modeling errors of user type distributions
larger support of distributions) aestj = a
true
j −
ǫ(atruej −a
true
j )
2 and
aestj = a
true
j +
ǫ(atruej −a
true
j )
2 , where ǫ > 0 characterizes the relative
estimation error. Then, the estimated aestj and a
est
j are fed to
the proposed optimal auction mechanism to allocate the cache
space and to decide the payments. In such a case, the ER of
the SP with varying relative error ǫ is shown in Fig. 8-(a). We
observe that the ER decreases smoothly with ǫ and the SP can
keep at least 75% of its ER as long as the relative error ǫ is no
more than 0.5. Moreover, we repeat the same experiment for
exponentially distributed user types. The estimated distribution
parameter is set to be λestj = (1+ǫ)λ
true
j , where λ
true
j is the true
distribution parameter for user j. In such a case, when ǫ varies
from −1 to 1, the corresponding ER of the SP is reported in
Fig. 8-(b). Analogous to the scenario of uniformly distributed
types, the ER still decreases with increasing relative error |ǫ|
when types are exponentially distributed. We also observe that
the ER decreases very slowly when ǫ is positive. Thus, if the
SP cannot infer λj precisely, he’d better overestimate it than
underestimate it. In other words, if the SP is unclear about the
true type distribution, he’d better underestimate the expected
valuation (1/λj) of users than overestimate it.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed an optimal auction mech-
anism for content caching to maximize the expected revenue
of the SP. The mechanism takes into consideration both the
content acquisition costs and the content delivery costs. It
incentivizes truthful reports of the private user types (incen-
tive compatibility) and user participation of the mechanism
(individual rationality). Moreover, computationally efficient
methods of calculating the optimal cache space allocation and
user payments have been presented and it has been shown
that a user does not need to pay anything if no content of her
interest is cached by the SP. We further examine the optimal
choice of the content delivery quality under the reasonable
hypothesis of large number of users and have derived a simple
formula to compute the optimal delivery quality. Finally,
extensive simulations have been carried out to evaluate the
performance of the proposed mechanism and the impact of
various model parameters has been highlighted.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
[Necessity] Suppose IC in (4) and IR in (5) hold. Then, for
any j = 1, ..., n, tj , τj ∈ Tj :
v˜j(tj) ≥ vj(τj , tj) (41)
= θ(tj − τj)p˜j(τj) + θτj p˜j(τj)− x˜j(τj) (42)
= θ(tj − τj)p˜j(τj) + v˜j(τj). (43)
Symmetrically, we have:
v˜j(τj)− v˜j(tj) ≥ θ(τj − tj)p˜j(tj). (44)
Hence,
θ(τj − tj)p˜j(τj) ≥ v˜j(τj)− v˜j(tj) ≥ θ(τj − tj)p˜j(tj). (45)
Since θ > 0, from (45), we have:
(τj − tj)(p˜j(τj)− p˜j(tj)) ≥ 0, ∀tj , τj ∈ Tj, (46)
which implies p˜j(·) is an increasing function, i.e., (i) holds.
From (45), for τj > tj :
θp˜j(τj) ≥
v˜j(τj)− v˜j(tj)
τj − tj
≥ θp˜j(tj). (47)
Letting τj approaches tj , we get:
lim
τj↓tj
v˜j(τj)− v˜j(tj)
τj − tj
= θp˜j(tj). (48)
It can be analogously shown that the left limit of the above
relation also holds so that ddtj v˜j(tj) = θp˜j(tj), ∀tj ∈ Tj .
Integration of this relation leads to statement (ii). Statement
(iii) clearly follows from IR.
[Sufficiency] In converse, suppose (i), (ii), (iii) hold. From
the FF constraint, we know p˜j(τj), ∀j and ∀τj ∈ Tj . Hence,
from (ii) and (iii), we have v˜j(tj) ≥ v˜j(aj) ≥ 0, i.e., IR
holds. Furthermore, from (9) and (ii), we can derive, for any
j = 1, ..., n, tj ∈ Tj :
x˜j(tj) = θtj p˜j(tj)− v˜j(aj)− θ
∫ tj
aj
p˜j(τj)dτj . (49)
Therefore, for any tj , t
′
j ∈ Tj:
v˜j(tj)− vj(t
′
j , tj)
= θtj p˜j(tj)− x˜j(tj)− θtj p˜j(t
′
j) + x˜j(t
′
j) (50)
= θ(t′j − tj)p˜j(t
′
j) + θ
∫ tj
t′
j
p˜j(τj)dτj (51)
= θ
∫ tj
t′
j
[
p˜j(τj)− p˜j(t
′
j)
]
dτj
(a)
≥ 0, (52)
where (a) follows from the monotonicity of p˜j(·) in (i). Thus,
IC holds.
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APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For feasible mechanism 〈p(·),x(·)〉, according to Lemma
1, we know that statements (i), (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 1 hold.
From the definition of v˜j(tj), we get, for any tj ∈ Tj:
v˜j(tj) =
∫
T−j
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
 θtj − xj(t)
 f−j(t−j)dt−j .
(53)
Along with statement (ii) of Lemma 1, we obtain:∫
T−j
xj(t)f−j(t−j)dt−j
=
∫
T−j
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
 θtjf−j(t−j)dt−j − v˜j(aj)
− θ
∫ tj
aj
p˜j(τj)dτj (54)
(a)
= −v˜j(aj) + θ
∫
T−j
{∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
 tj
−
∫ tj
aj
∑
i∈Sj
pi(τj , t−j)dτj
}
f−j(t−j)dt−j , (55)
where in (a) we make use of the definition of p˜j(τj) in (10) and
interchange the order of integrals. Performing the operation∫
Tj
(· · · )fj(tj)dtj on both sides of the above equation, we
obtain:∫
T
xj(t)f(t)dt
= −v˜j(aj) + θ
∫
T
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
 tjf(t)dt
− θ
∫
T−j

∫
Tj
∫ tj
a
j
∑
i∈Sj
pi(τj , t−j)
 fj(tj)dτjdtj

· f−j(t−j)dt−j (56)
(a)
= −v˜j(aj) + θ
∫
T
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
 tjf(t)dt
− θ
∫
T−j
∫
Tj
[1− Fj(tj)]
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
 dtjf−j(t−j)dt−j
(57)
= −v˜j(aj) + θ
∫
T
[
tj −
1− Fj(tj)
fj(tj)
]∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
 f(t)dt,
(58)
where in (a) we interchange order of inte-
grals:
∫
Tj
∫ tj
a
j
[∑
i∈Sj
pi(τj , t−j)
]
fj(tj)dτjdtj =∫
Tj
∫ aj
τj
[∑
i∈Sj
pi(τj , t−j)
]
fj(tj)dtjdτj =
∫
Tj
[1 −
Fj(tj)]
[∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
]
dtj .
Substituting (58) into (1), we get:
ER = −
n∑
j=1
v˜j(aj)
+ θ
∫
T

n∑
j=1
[
tj −
1− Fj(tj)
fj(tj)
]∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)

 f(t)dt
−
∫
T
{
m∑
i=1
pi(t) [ri + |Ωi|h(θ)]
}
f(t)dt (59)
(a)
= −
n∑
j=1
v˜j(aj) + θ
∫
T
{
n∑
j=1
[
tj −
1− Fj(tj)
fj(tj)
−
h(θ)
θ
]
·
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t)
}f(t)dt− ∫
T
[
m∑
i=1
pi(t)ri
]
f(t)dt,
(60)
where in (a) we make use of
∑n
j=1
∑
i∈Sj
pi(t) =∑m
i=1 pi(t)|Ωi|.
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